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The Political Economy Equilibrium of
Environmental and Trade Policies in the U.S.

The U.S. has incorporated environmental policies into its all free trade agreements
since it negotiated the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in the early
1990s. The inclusion of environmental policies represented a major shift in trade
policy but the environmental policies have not drastically changed in subsequent
trade agreements over the past 25 years despite the continued involvement of
environmental constituencies and policymakers. The punctuated equilibrium model
provides the analytical framework for understanding the factors that gave rise to
the drastic policy shift under NAFTA as well as the subsequent policy stasis, in
order to inform future policymaking efforts. Based on this analysis, it appears that
environmentalists and policymakers will likely be able to maintain the
environmental policy status quo within the trade policy domain but should consider
another policy arena for advancing their new environmental policy priorities.

Linda Allen

INTRODUCTION
Ever since the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) (1993) was
negotiated in the early 1990s, it has become a rite of passage for every subsequent
U.S. trade agreement to be scrutinized for its potential to adversely affect the
environment. This scrutiny typically gives rise to set-piece political negotiations to
ensure that some policies are included to address environmental impacts, which in
turn facilitate passage of the trade agreement. Successive environmental policies
are frequently presented as being stronger or more far-reaching than earlier policies
but in reality, the political economy equilibrium and thus content of these policies
has not changed much over the past 25 years.
The equilibrium reflects the balancing of political and economic factors that
influence the design of the environmental policies. In a world free of politics, trade
policies would be designed solely based on economic principles (Friedan 2020).
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However, trade policies have variable impacts on society and touch upon other
issues not directly related to tariffs, such as environmental regulations or labor
rights. The consideration of these non-tariff or distributional issues, in turn,
introduces other interest groups and politics into the trade policy domain and
influences trade policy outcomes. Starting with NAFTA, trade policies have
increasingly been influenced by the politics associated with non-tariff issues,
including environmental issues (Audley 1997, Destler and Balint 2000).
As a result, a suite of environmental policies has been developed in
conjunction with all U.S. trade agreements since NAFTA. While no two trade
agreements have the same exact suite of policies, collectively, the policies have not
changed drastically over the years, reflecting a stable political economy
equilibrium. Scholars have written extensively about many aspects of the trade and
environment policy debate but little attention has focused on the factors that give
rise to the equilibrium. This article addresses this gap by examining the actors and
interests that influence development of the policies, and in doing so, can inform
efforts by policymakers and policy advocates to craft similar policies in future trade
agreements or more importantly, to seek alternative policy arenas for advancing
their policy priorities.
The punctuated equilibrium model provides the analytical framework for the
discussion presented in this article; this model is a well-established policy process
model that has been widely used to explain emergence and change or stasis of
policies over time, and it is well-suited to examining trade-related environmental
policies (Allen 2020). The analysis draws upon qualitative data related negotiation
of trade-related environmental policies from archival records, published literature,
and interviews and opinion surveys of key stakeholders involved in policy
negotiations obtained by Allen (2005, 2018a). Overall, the article is organized as
follows: first, an overview of environmental policies for U.S. trade agreements is
provided, followed by a discussion of the actors and factors that contributed to the
emergence of trade-related environmental policies, followed by discussion of the
factors that have contributed to their stability, and lastly the conclusions.

OVERVIEW OF ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES FOR U.S. TRADE
AGREEMENTS
NAFTA was the first trade agreement to explicitly incorporate policies to address
the potential negative environmental effects of trade liberalization. When this trade
agreement was negotiated in the early 1990s, environmentalists raised concerns
over the agreement’s potential to reduce levels of environmental protection in all
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three NAFTA countries (Audley 1997). In particular, environmentalists claimed
that freer trade would create ‘pollution havens’ in Mexico due to its’ lax
enforcement of environmental laws and the relocation of dirty industries there to
take advantage of lower compliance costs (Allen 2018b). The lax enforcement in
Mexico, in turn, would foster a race to the bottom in the U.S. and Canada as they
rolled back their enforcement of laws to retain industries (Allen 2018b).
Environmentalists also argued that NAFTA would include trade disciplines that
could be used to challenge to legitimate domestic environmental regulations and
trade measures in multilateral environmental agreements as discriminatory nontariff barriers to trade, and lastly, that trade liberalization under NAFTA would
more generally accelerate the exploitation of natural resources due to liberalization
of certain economic sectors and foster a general increase in levels of pollution due
to economic growth (Allen 2018b).
To address to these environmental concerns, a suite of environmental policies
was crafted for NAFTA, with a few policies included in the trade agreement itself
but the majority of policies included in an environmental side agreement to
NAFTA. Since NAFTA was negotiated, the U.S. has paired a similar suite of
environmental policies with all its free trade agreement.1 In general, the existing
suite of environmental policies for U.S. trade agreements is comprised of a mix of
core “legacy” policies from NAFTA, which focused on the range of concerns
related to trade liberalization under that agreement, along with a few newer policies
focused on issues that transcend specific trade agreements, such as protection of
global common pool resources like marine fisheries (see Table 1) (Allen 2014). In
general, the salience of the environmental concerns varied somewhat; the most
salient concerns were associated with lax enforcement of environmental laws and
the associated policies consisted of a requirement for effective enforcement of laws
by all trading partners, coupled with various mechanisms to ensure compliance.
Substantively, there have been some variations in environmental policies across the
trade agreements, however, taken collectively, the substantive content of these
policies has not changed significantly over the past 25 years based on detailed
reviews (Allen 2018a). The sudden emergence of the environmental policies for
U.S. trade agreements and their relatively stability over time is examined further
below using the punctuated equilibrium model, a contemporary model of the
policymaking process.

1

As of 2020, the U.S. had negotiated 13 new bilateral and regional free trade agreements since
NAFTA as well as renegotiated NAFTA, and all but one agreement has been ratified and entered
into force. The agreement that was not ratified is the Trans-Pacific Partnership.
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POLICY EMERGENCE
According to the punctuated equilibrium model, the policymaking process is
“characterized by long periods of incremental change punctuated by brief periods
of major change” (Sabatier 1999, 9). Policies are formulated within issue-specific
policy domains or subsystems. Established policy subsystems often foster policy
stasis or stability, but can be transformed when actors external to the subsystem
redefine the policy issue and force changes within the subsystem, resulting in major
policy shifts or “punctuations” (Baumgartner, Jones and Mortensen 2014). The
central dynamic at play in the punctuated equilibrium model is the changing
definitions of policy issues and agenda setting, which occurs amid the overlap and
interaction between the politics of issue-specific policy subsystem(s) and the
macro-politics of the Congress and presidency (Baumgartner, Jones and Mortensen
2014). The redefinition of policy issues may generate political support at the macrolevel for a drastic policy shift. Once this policy shift occurs, the transformed policy
subsystem establishes a new equilibrium and near policy stasis resumes until the
policy issues are redefined again and give rise to another major policy shift.
Prior to NAFTA, trade policy in the U.S. had long been crafted by a wellestablished policy monopoly operating within a stable policy subsystem. This
monopoly was comprised of powerful export-oriented producer interest groups
(e.g. U.S. Chamber of Commerce) and industries and closely aligned pro-free trade
legislators and bureaucrats (e.g., U.S. Trade Representative) (Destler and Balint
2000). The policy image (or public perception) of trade policy established by the
policy monopoly was that it contributed to the economic well-being of all of society
and for many years this image was not challenged. Environmentalists did not have
a formal role in the trade policy subsystem and the trade community did not
consider environmental issues explicitly within free trade agreements (Audley
1997, Esty 1993). However, this all changed with NAFTA. Due a convergence of
several factors, environmentalists were able to successfully gain access to the trade
policy domain and redefine the policy issues within policy subsystem and recast
the policy image associated with trade liberalization.
Overall, there were four principle factors that converged during the NAFTA
negotiations that allowed the environmentalists to significantly influence trade
policy. First, the beneficial view of trade liberalization was already coming under
attack by the late 1980s as increased foreign competition lead to de-industrialization
and economic devastation in the U.S. (Aaronson 2001). This competition was even
more of a concern for trade liberalization with developing countries, such as
Mexico, that had lower levels of social safeguards for environmental protection and
labor rights (Congressional Research Service 2017). Thus, efforts to redefine policy
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issues within the trade policy subsystem were already underway and NAFTA
provided fertile ground for pursuing those efforts more aggressively.
Second, the existing environmental degradation along the U.S.-Mexico border
provided a highly visible harbinger of what might occur elsewhere in Mexico as
trade and investment were further liberalized (Johnson and Beaulieu 1996). This
degradation was instrumental in recasting the policy image that NAFTA would lead
to worse environmental conditions. Third, the adverse ruling by a GATT arbitral
panel in 1991 related to U.S. restrictions on tuna imports from Mexico only
reinforced the apocalyptic predictions that trade regime rules would undermine
domestic environmental safeguards (Ritchie 1990, Christensen 1991). Lastly, the
environmental groups had become adept at successfully advancing their interests
in other realms of international economic policy, such as development financing by
the multilateral development banks (Rich 1985) and participation in international
trade policy was a logical next step.
Against this backdrop, environmentalists established tentative linkages
between trade liberalization and levels of environmental protection in the three
NAFTA countries. Using these linkages, they effectively recast the policy image of
free trade as fostering extensive and dire environmental consequences and reducing
quality of life in North America. The new policy image was in sharp contrast to the
existing image of free trade benefiting all of society as it fostered economic
efficiency. As a result of the policy issue redefinition and image recasting, the
environmentalists, comprised of a mixed of border and national-level
environmental groups, upset the trade policy monopoly and gained access to the
trade policy subsystem in the U.S. along with closely aligned pro-free trade / proenvironment legislators and bureaucrats (e.g., U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency), significantly transforming the policy subsystem (Audley 1997). The
environmental groups’ participation in the policy subsystem ultimately resulted in
the inclusion of a suite of environmental policies in NAFTA, a major shift in policy
compared to the status quo prior to that trade agreement (Audley 1997). At that
time, a new political economy equilibrium was established within the trade policy
subsystem that has remained fairly stable, with only incremental changes to the
environmental policies over the past 25 years. The main reason for this stability is
that the environmentalists have not been able to recast the trade policy image or
redefine the policy issues in a manner that substantially changes the status quo.
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POLICY STABILITY
Without a doubt, the emergence of environmental policies in the trade policy
subsystem during the NAFTA negotiations is attributed to the ability of the
environmental groups to effectively redefine trade policy issues and recast the
policy image within the subsystem. These actions generated political support from
members of the U.S. Congress and President to incorporate environmental policies
into NAFTA (Bush 1995, Clinton 1995, Browner 1995, Audley 1997). A
convergence of several factors at a particular point in time, as noted above, created
a unique window of opportunity for environmentalists to gain access to the trade
policy domain and mobilize public opinion and macro-level political support to
change the policy status quo. Their ability to mobilize support was so effective that
including addressing the environmental concerns became a political imperative for
passage of NAFTA (Audley 1997, Mayer 1998, Johnson and Beaulieu 1996).
As it turned out, however, the intense debate and public concern over the
environmental impacts of NAFTA was a high-water mark for U.S. trade
agreements. Since NAFTA, environmentalists have not been able to replicate that
feat and attain a similar level of public mobilization or macro-level political support
for any subsequent U.S. trade agreement. As a result, the substantive content of the
environmental policies for U.S. trade agreements has remained fairly stable since
NAFTA and only incremental policy changes have been made for other trade
agreements. In other words, the trade policy subsystem reached a new political
economy equilibrium during NAFTA negotiations and it has not changed
drastically over the past 25 years. Overall, there are several reasons for the stability
of trade policy subsystem, which is likely to remain for the foreseeable future.
First and foremost, the dire predictions of an environmental apocalypse in the
NAFTA countries never materialized (Gallagher 2004, Stern 2007, Vaughan 2004).
As a result, the political saliency of the environmental concerns diminished within
the trade policy subsystem. Second, many of the subsequent U.S. trade agreements
have been with countries that either have adequate levels of environmental
protection (e.g. Australia, Singapore) or limited competitive advantages (e.g.
Bahrain, Jordan, Oman), further diminishing the saliency of the environmental
issues. Third, the environmental policies that were developed for NAFTA and other
trade agreements have had little impact on improving environmental conditions for
trading partners (Tollefson 2002, Dorn 2007, Knox 2010, Environmental Groups
Say 2007, Allen 2018a, Allen 2012, USTR Comes Under Fire 2015), which
highlights the limitations of using trade policy as a vehicle for achieving broader
environmental policy objectives.
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Although the saliency for environmental concerns within the trade policy
subsystem decreased after NAFTA, environmentalists have remained actively
involved in trade policy negotiations and a few of the more recent trade agreements
have received some scrutiny within the subsystem. In particular, the regional trade
agreement with five Central American countries and the Dominican Republic (DRCAFTA) (Environmentalists’ Letter 2004, Abetti 2008), the regional Trans-Pacific
Partnership (TPP, which was negotiated but not adopted by the U.S.) (U.S.
Environmental Groups 2010), and the bilateral trade agreement with Peru
(Environmental Groups Unlikely 2007, Environmental Groups Laud 2007) have
received some level of scrutiny by environmentalists. The most recent trade
agreement completed by the U.S. in 2019, the United States-Mexico-Canada
Agreement (USMCA), however, received very limited scrutiny when compared to
its predecessor, NAFTA (Environmental Groups: USMCA 2018, Laurens, et al.
2019, Gantz 2019, W&M Democrats 2019).
Given the low levels of scrutiny, environmentalists have struggled to
drastically redefine trade policy issues within the policy subsystem, much less
generate macro-level political support for drastic policy shifts. Nonetheless, the
environmental groups have achieved a few policy innovations in these trade
agreements, such as the forestry sector governance provisions in the Peru trade
agreement (Environmental Groups Laud 2007) and the illegal, unregulated and
unreported fishing provisions in the TPP (U.S. TPP Environment Proposal 2011,
USTR Touts 2011, Tsangalis 2016, Addressing Conservation Challenges 2013) and
the USMCA (Tienharra 2019, Stewart and Noorbaloochi 2019). However, when
considering these newer environmental policies within the larger suite of existing
policies, these changes have been marginal (see Table 1) (Allen 2018a). The
inability of the environmental groups to drastically redefine trade policy issues or
reset the policy agenda since NAFTA is most clearly reflected in the recent
negotiation of the USMCA.
Given the attention that environmental issues received during negotiation of
NAFTA as well as the long-standing criticisms of the limited impact its
environmental policies have had, it was anticipated that environmental issues
would be front and center during the negotiation of the USMCA (Page 2007, Mach
2008, Environmental Groups: USMCA 2018, Environmental Groups Unlikely
2007, Levin Warns 2009, Labor Unions, Enviros 2014). However, instead of
identifying new environmental policy concerns that would redefine the trade policy
issues that warrant attention, the environmentalists have often identified the same
concerns related to implementation of multi-lateral environmental agreements or
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the investor-state dispute settlement process2 that have been repeatedly raised for
past trade agreements (Environmental Groups: USMCA 2018, Sierra Club 2018b,
Sierra Club 2018a). In lieu of presenting dire images of the environmental havoc
that would occur due to further trade liberalization, environmentalists advanced
nuanced arguments about legal minutiae that clearly failed to mobilize public
opinion or macro-level politics.
In addition to the lack of a compelling narrative for redefining policy issues or
a radical recasting of the trade policy image compared to status quo, the
environmental groups that are actively involved in the trade policy subsystem have
evolved (see Tables 2 and 3) and current groups may have less potential to affect
policy changes. In general, many of the environmental groups that now participate
in trade policy negotiations have in the past been hostile to policy negotiations, such
as Sierra Club, Friends of the Earth, or Greenpeace USA, or are new to the trade
policy subsystem, or lack strong national-level environmental policy bona fides,
such as Food & Water Watch, Hip Hop Caucus, Power Shift Network, or
GreenLatinos (Sierra Club 2018b, Sierra Club 2018a). As such, it is not clear that
their new policy proposals are even achievable. Even though these environmental
groups have attained some marginal policy changes in recent years, their
involvement in the trade policy subsystem at this point seems more geared towards
preventing policy backsliding rather than radically redefining policy issues or
recasting policy images to advance new environmental policies. In light of the
weaken position of environmentalists, it is not surprising that the political economy
equilibrium for the trade policy subsystem and suite of environmental policies for
trade agreements has remained fairly stable and is likely to remain so for the
foreseeable future.

CONCLUSIONS
For almost three decades, the U.S. has been at the forefront of incorporating
environmental policies into its all free trade agreements to address the potential
adverse environmental impacts of trade liberalization (Allen 2018a, Jinnah and
Morgera 2013, Van Roozendaal 2009). NAFTA was the first trade agreement to
include environmental policies and the emergence of these policies represented a
major policy shift within the trade policy domain. Prior to NAFTA, trade policy
See e.g., environmentalists’ comments on Trans-Pacific Partnership, “Solomon specifically
pointed out that the bill does not preclude negotiators from including an investor-state dispute
settlement (ISDS) mechanism in trade agreements and argued that such provisions can open the
door to private corporations suing governments over regulations related to environmental protection.
ISDS has been part of U.S. trade policy in every major recent trade agreement.”
2
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had been crafted by a relatively small group of pro-free trade advocates within a
stable policy subsystem and environmental policy issues had not been explicitly
considered within the context of free trade agreements. However, a convergence of
events in the early 1990s created a window of opportunity for environmental groups
to gain access to the trade policy subsystem and redefine trade policy issues and
recast the trade policy image. By doing so, these groups were able to mobilize
public opinion and macro-level political support to advance their policy priorities
for mitigating the environmental impacts of NAFTA.
This transformation of the trade policy system has allowed environmental
groups to continue to participate in the trade policy negotiations and ensure a
similar suite of environmental policies is included in all subsequent trade
agreements. Over the years, these groups added a few innovative policies, but
collectively, the environmental policies associated with trade agreements have not
changed drastically. This near policy stasis reflects a new political economy
equilibrium within the trade policy subsystem that environmentalists have not been
able to change. One of the main reasons why the post-NAFTA equilibrium has been
so resistant to change is that many of the environmental concerns raised during
NAFTA never materialized, undermining the rationale for many of the original
policies. Although these policies have been retained over the years to forestall
claims of backsliding, the lack of a credible basis for policies casts a long shadow
over subsequent environmental policy negotiations. In addition, the coalition of
environmental groups actively involved in the trade policy subsystem has evolved
and appears to have a more limited ability to affect policy change.
As such, the existing political economy equilibrium and suite of environmental
policies associated with U.S. trade agreements is likely to remain the same for the
foreseeable future and the continued participation of environmental groups in the
trade policy domain will ensure that this status quo is maintained. However, given
their limited ability to advance substantively different policies within the trade
policy domain, environmentalists and policymakers should consider looking for a
new policy arena to advance their environmental policy priorities. Overall, U.S.
trade agreements have more recently been viewed merely as useful vehicles for
achieving non-agreement related environmental policy goals that have not been
adequately addressed in other venues, reflecting a process of “regime shifting”
(Laurens and Morin 2019). Thus, it is perhaps time to shift to a different policy
subsystem given the stasis achieved in the trade policy domain.
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Table 1: Policies by Substantive Content and Policy Locus*
NAFTA

Other U.S. Trade
Agreements

Draft TPP

USMCA

Levels of environmental protection

ESA

FTA

FTA

FTA

Procedural guarantees, access to proceedings, right to seek remedies

ESA

FTA

FTA

FTA

Opportunities for public participation

ESA

FTA and ESA

FTA

FTA

Voluntary mechanisms to enhance environmental performance

-

FTA

FTA

FTA

Corporate social responsibility

-

-

FTA

FTA

Non-derogation of environmental laws

FTA

FTA

FTA

FTA

Environmental cooperation

ESA

FTA and ESA

FTA and ESA

FTA and ESA

Work plan or program

ESA

ESA

-

ESA

Periodic or regular meetings

ESA

ESA

FTA

ESA

Other Obligations

Enforcement
of Laws

Environmental
Cooperation

Domestic Regimes

Environmental Policy

Benchmarks or performance indicators

-

ESA

FTA

ESA

Targeted areas for cooperation

-

FTA and ESA

FTA

FTA

Effective enforcement domestic environmental laws

ESA

FTA

FTA

FTA

State-to-state consultation and dispute settlement process

ESA

FTA

FTA

FTA

Environmental experts in dispute resolution

ESA

FTA

FTA

FTA

Public submissions on enforcement matters

ESA

FTA

-

FTA and ESA

Privilege MEA obligations over trade agreement obligations

FTA

FTA

-

FTA

Enhance mutual supportiveness of FTA and MEA obligations

-

FTA

FTA

-

Support environmental goals of FTA

ESA

-

-

-

Evaluate environmental effects of FTA

ESA

-

-

-

Complete independent reports

ESA

-

-

-

Develop transboundary environmental assessment protocol

ESA

-

-

-

Promote trade in environmental goods and services

-

-

FTA

FTA

Adopt, maintain, and implement laws to fulfill MEA obligations

-

FTA

FTA

FTA

Forest sector governance

-

FTA

-

-

Illegal, unreported, unregulated fishing, fisheries subsidies, sustainable forestry

-

-

FTA

FTA

* Policy locus is location of the policy, environmental side agreement (“ESA”) and free trade agreement (“FTA”). Source: (Allen 2018a)
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Table 2: Interest Groups for NAFTA Environmental Policy Negotiations
Interest Group

Specific organization

Moderate or accommodating
environmental group

National Wildlife Federation
World Wildlife Fund
Environmental Defense Fund
The Nature Conservancy
National Audubon Society
Defenders of Wildlife
Natural Resources Defense Council
Pollution Probe
Union of Environmental Groups
Autonomous Institute for Ecological Research
Group of Hundred

Radical or adversarial environmental
groups

Greenpeace
Public Citizen
Sierra Club
Friends of the Earth
Texas Center for Policy Studies
Mexican Action Network on Free Trade
Pact of Ecologist Group
Border Health and Environmental Network
Canadian Environmental Law Association
Action Canada Network

Private sector interest groups

U.S. Chamber of Commerce
Business Roundtable
Border Trade Alliance
U.S. Alliance for NAFTA
National Foreign Trade Council
The U.S. Council of the Mexico-U.S. Business Committee
Trade Partnership
U.S. Council of International Business
The Council of the Americas
Emergency Committee for American Trade
National Association of Manufacturers
American Chamber of Commerce of Mexico
Coordinating Organization of Business Agencies of Foreign Trade

Source: (Allen 2005)
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Table 3: Interest Groups for Other Trade Agreement Environmental Policy Negotiations
Trade Agreement

DR-CAFTA

Specific organization
Center for International Environmental Law
Defenders of Wildlife
Earthjustice
Friends of the Earth
League of Conservation Voters
National Environmental Trust
Latin America Natural Resources Defense Council
National Wildlife Federation
Sierra Club
U.S. PIRG
Lead Organizations
Defenders of Wildlife
Earthjustice
Environmental Investigation Agency
Friends of the Earth
Sierra Club
Other Organizations

TPP
Oceana, Natural Resources Defense Council, Alaska Wilderness League, Clean
Water Action, Endangered Species Coalition, Environment America,
Environmental Defense Fund, Humane Society International, Humane Society of
the United States, League of Conservation Voters, National Audubon Society,
National Parks Conservation Association, Native American Rights Fund, Ocean
Conservancy, Physicians for Social Responsibility, Population Action
International, Population Connection, Rare, The Nature Conservancy, World
Wildlife Fund

Lead Organization
Sierra Club
Other Organizations
USMCA

350.org, Center for Biological Diversity, Center for International
Environmental Law, Earthjustice, Food & Water Watch, Friends of the
Earth, Green For All, GreenLatinos, Greenpeace USA, Hip Hop Caucus,
League of Conservation Voters, Oil Change International, People’s
Action, Power Shift Network, Sunrise Movement

Sources: (Sierra Club 2018a, Addressing Conservation Challenges 2013, U.S. Environmental Groups 2010,
Environmentalists’ Letter 2004)
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